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I. INTRODUCTION
New telephone information technology has created commercial opportunities for business and has enhanced
information services for consumers
through innovations such as autodialed
calls, fax machines, pay-per-call or
audiotext ("900 number") services, and
caller identification services. The same
technology also has created new ways
to commit telemarketing fraud and has
decreased individual privacy through
the disclosure of telephone numbers
and the compilation of credit, buying,
and other personal information in databases. Further, it has allowed
unsolicited telephone calls and fax
messages to disrupt life at home and the
office. A tension among First Amendment rights to send and receive messages, individuals' expectations of privacy in their homes, and control over
private information, and consumer protection from deception and fraud has
affected the exploitation of these new
opportunities for disseminating and
collecting information.'
Public outcry has prompted federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies to create laws, to
enhance law enforcement, and to
address consumer concerns about
fraud, privacy, and public safety.
For example, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") recently adopted regulations that impose restrictions on 900 numbers to
prevent fraud and deceptive practices. 2 Congress also recently enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,3 which restricts
unsolicited telemarketing calls and

prohibits some autodialed calls and
unsolicited faxes.
The recent regulations and legislation focus on different aspects of the
problems created by new information
technology, but both are the result of
consumer complaints about particular
abuses in the industry. Both attempt to
balance consumer expectations of privacy and freedom from deception with
the First Amendment rights of businesses to use the technology to disseminate information for profit and with the
First Amendment rights of willing consumers to receive that information.
This two-part article will discuss
three specific telemarketing practices
that new technology has produced. Part
I will look at the 900 number call
business, while Part II will examine
live and prerecorded telemarketing calls
that use autodialing equipment and the
business use of Caller ID. For each
telemarketing practice, the article will
analyze proposed and enacted statutes
and regulations that deal with these
business practices. Each restriction
also will be analyzed in terms of balancing constitutional and other rights.
In particular, the article will address
the balance between the First Amendment and consumers' rights to privacy
and freedom from deception and fraud.
II. 900 NUMBER INFORMATION
SERVICES
Many specialized telephone technology businesses can profit from either 900 or 976 information services,
including the information provider, the
long-distance carrier, the local-exchange carrier, and perhaps a service
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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bureau and billing service. In this
article, "900 number" will be used to
refer collectively to the interstate 900
and intrastate 976 services.
Usually, 900 number services begin
with an information provider who creates the content of the message ultimately received by the caller. Some
information providers own the equipment necessary to answer their calls,
but many hire a service bureau with the

Interactive technology- allowing
callers to choose different options
through the touch-tone keypad, in
conjunction with new computers
that could respond to thousands
of phone calls in a short period of
time and software that could
organize facts about millions of
customers, made the pay-per-call
services attractive for countless
legitimate uses.
equipment to manage incoming calls
for many vendors. Long-distance carriers either might provide such service
or might connect interstate calls to a
service bureau. Local carriers generally connect the caller to the longdistance carrier and often provide billing services for the information vendor.4 For each 900 number call, the
caller is charged a fee ranging from
$.50 to $50, or he is charged a per-unitof-time fee. The local phone company
and the long-distance carrier usually
receive about 35 percent of the charge,
the audiotext service bureau receives
10 percent of the charge, and the information provider receives 55 percent of
the charge.'
A. Growth of 900 Number Use
While variations of the pay-per-call
telephone service have existed since
1974, the 900 number surfaced in 1980
when it was used to poll viewers of the
televised Ronald Reagan/Jimmy Carter
presidential debates. In the industry's
early days, the long-distance carriers
Volume 5 Number 3 / Spring 1993

controlled these services, and they generally consisted of only one-minute
calls, at $.50 per call. The media used
the services primarily for publicity
purposes. 6
The pay-per-call industry flourished
after the breakup of American Telephone & Telegraph Company
("AT&T"). As part of the AT&T
proceedings, enhanced common carrier services, including pay-per-call
services, were removed from FCC scrutiny.7 Title II of the Communications
Act of 1934 gives the FCC authority to
judge the legality of charges, classifications, regulations, and practices by
interstate or foreign wire or radio communication.8 In 1980, the FCC distinguished basic transmission services from
enhanced services and removed enhanced services from Title II regulation.9 Enhanced services were defined
as those that "combine basic service
with computer processing applications
that act on ...aspects of the subscriber's
transmitted information ... or. .. involve subscriber interaction with stored
information."'" As part of the deregulation of these enhanced services during the AT&T breakup, the regional
Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"),
such as Ameritech and Bell Atlantic,
were prohibited from any involvement
in information services, among other
things."
In 1988, a United States District
Court lifted this restriction, allowing
the BOCs to transmit information, but
it maintained the ban on the BOCs'
creation of information content. 2 Thus,
the BOCs could act as service bureaus
that carried or transmitted 900 number
services with messages created by other
information providers, but they were
prohibited from actually creating any
messages they carried. The court reasoned that because the BOCs still possessed monopoly control over the local
telephone exchange network, as transmitters, they could discriminate easily
against competitor information providers. 3
In July 1991, the court removed the
restriction on information services; the

BOCs finally could generate their own
information services, including 900
numbers. 4 The decision spurred much
speculation and concern within the 900
number industry, 5 but the BOCs immediately began to roll out comprehensive audiotext service plans. 6 It is
unclear whether the BOCs' involvement will decrease competition in the
industry or whether they will use their
size and power to promote the industry
by introducing innovations and new
legitimate uses for the technology.
In addition to changes in the regulatory climate, technological advances in
the 1980s boosted the 900 number
industry. Although the original 900
number services primarily offered "diala-porn" adult entertainment lines, interactive computer technology introduced in 1988 enhanced the industry
because it allowed the caller to choose
different options through the touchtone
keypad. Interactive technology, in
conjunction with new computers that
could respond to thousands of phone
calls in a short period of time and
software that could organize facts about
millions of customers, made the payper-call services attractive for countless legitimate uses. 7 In 1991, Americans spent $975 million on 900 number
services that offered everything from
sports statistics to stock quotes to computer support services, up from $60
million in 1988." The 900 number
even became a tool in the 1992 presidential campaign, when one George
Bush supporter created a 900 number
with messages slighting Bill Clinton. 9
Meanwhile, the industry is exploring other possibilities for using the new
technology. Television producers are
planning interactive game shows, and
marketers are considering ways to use
the service for one-on-one marketing.'
In fact, some cable channels are devoted entirely to interactive marketing
21
"infomercials" that use 900 numbers.
Also, many television programs have
used 900 numbers to gain viewer feedback and participation. For example,
MTV uses 900 numbers to enable viewers to vote on the music videos they
71
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want to see. 22 MTV's sister channel,
VH 1, is staging an awards show based
on viewers' call-in votes to 900 numbers. The campaign will be supported
by magazine advertisements and VH 1
commercials with the 900 number and
a corresponding sweepstakes.23 The
900 number industry's revenues are
expected to grow to $1.3 billion in
1993 and to more than $1.8 billion in
1995.24
I

The federal government

increasinglyhas stepped inand
implemented regulations to fill the
gaps left between individual
states'regulations.

B. The Inevitable Fraud
While 900 number technology has
created vast selling and service possibilities, it also has become a venue for
consumer fraud. Common fraudulent
practices include failing to inform the
caller of the charge, inserting long
delays between when the call is answered and when the caller receives the
message, charging inflated fees for
packages of worthless generic information, and aiming manipulative appeals directly at children and other
vulnerable audiences. 25 Some services
advertise a toll-free number that, when
called, relays a message directing customers to call a 900 number. 26 Other
services relay messages so quickly or of
such poor quality that people must call
the number several times to hear the
entire message.2 1 One service, called
"collect 900," involved a computer call
to a home and an offer to sell information or products. The call recipient was
instructed either to press a number or to
hang up to avoid the charge. If call
recipients did not understand the instructions or did not respond quickly
enough, they were charged for the
call. 28 Another scheme offered bogus
products, such as pre-approved credit
cards that actually were charge cards
good only for the purchase of products
72

29
from a related catalog.
Fraudulent telemarketing schemes
have concerned federal and state governments as well as consumer groups,
telephone and long-distance companies, and the advertising media. Abusive practices have even gained the
attention of the industry itself, particularly services that promote legitimate
business uses of new telemarketing technology. Representatives of these groups
have provided information to federal
agencies that have jurisdiction over
various aspects of the 900 number business, but no single agency has authority
to regulate every aspect of the business.

C. Regulation of 900/976 Numbers
As a result of consumer concerns
ad complaints about deceptive or annoying practices, many individual states
have enacted regulations regarding payper-call numbers and have placed restrictions on all types of telemarketing
practices. For instance, many states
regulate the use of intrastate pay-percall services. These regulations create
restrictions on 976 number advertisements,' require disclosures in recorded
messages,3 place restrictions on telephone company actions when consumers refuse to pay for 976 number
charges,32 and create special provisions
for 976 numbers aimed at children.33
However, state actions against 900
numbers are not feasible because interstate services are beyond state jurisdiction. In the past few years, the federal
government increasingly has stepped
in and implemented regulations to fill
the gaps left between individual states'
regulations.
The Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and the FCC are the primary
federal regulators with jurisdiction over
the regulation of some aspects of 900
numbers and telemarketing. The FTC
has jurisdiction over interstate unfair
or deceptive acts and practices, including those involving 900 numbers.34
The FTC acts against a deceptive practice when a representation, omission,
or practice has been made that was
likely to mislead a consumer, when the

consumer acted reasonably under the
circumstances, and when the representation, omission, or practice was material.35 Whether a practice, including an
advertisement or telemarketing promotion, is likely to deceive depends on
whether it was reasonable for consumers, in making a purchasing decision, to
be influenced by the representation.

I

The first wave of 900 number
regulation came in the mid-1980s,
when the FCC placed restrictions
on 900 numbers carrying
pornographic messages.

The average person test is applied unless the advertisement is aimed at a
special audience, such as children.36
Failing to disclose information also can
be misleading if, in light of the typical
consumer's expectations and understandings, a disclosure would be appropriate. A representation is considered
material if it is likely to affect a
consumer's behavior, including a purchasing decision.37
Since Janet Steiger took charge of
the FTC, she has made fighting fraud in
telemarketing and 900 numbers one of
the agency's priorities.38 The FTC
filed fifty-nine telemarketing fraud
cases in federal courts between 1983
and the beginning of 1991. According
to FTC estimates, $1 billion of the
$105 billion in 1988 telemarketing sales
came from fraudulent schemes.3 9 As of
October 1990, the FTC had already
recovered $148 million from fraudulent telemarketing services, and many
of these enforcement actions involved
900 numbers.' For example, the FTC
recently reached a one million dollar
settlement with a Georgia company,
TransWorld Courier Services, to redress consumers who had called a 900
number seeking job information. 4' The
service's newspaper advertisements did
not disclose that the caller would be
charged $15 to $18 for the call, and
many callers never received the promisedjob information. Otherconsumers
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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called a toll-free 800 number which
directed them to call a 900 number,
without warning them of the charge.
The FTC also ordered Transworld to
disclose the call's cost in its advertising, to insert a preamble at the beginning of the phone message telling callers they could avoid the charge by
hanging up immediately, and to ensure
that consumers would not be billed if
they did hang up during the preamble.42
The FTC also has filed complaints
against several companies that promised to provide audiotext callers with
credit cards.43 In those cases, the callers
received a card that could be used only
to purchase items from catalogs distributed by the companies, and they
were charged a substantial fee for the
call.
Although the FTC is investigating
and acting against fraudulent 900 number practices, it has not proposed any
rules to regulate the 900 number industry. In a speech to the National Press
Club in March 1991, the director of the
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection
stated that the FTC had not taken "any
position on the need for, or desirability
of, legislation or other government
regulation directed at the ... indusHowever in 1990, the FTC
try."
alert advising how to
a
consumer
issued
avoid 900 number scams,45 and the
agency has been cooperating with state
attorneys general to investigate and
litigate against fraudulent 900 number
6

scams.4

While the FTC has no specific regulations concerning 900 numbers, the
FCC regulates the interstate aspect of
the 900 number industry. The FCC has
authority over interstate telephone services, including 900 number and 700
number talk lines. The first wave of
900 number regulation came in the
mid-1980s, when the FCC placed restrictions on 900 numbers carrying
pornographic messages. The Communications Act of 1934 currently regulates only 900 numbers involving ob47
scene or indecent communications.
Following a line of cases culminating
in the Supreme Court decision Sable
Volume 5 Number 3 /Spring 1993

The rules require that all 900
number messages that charge
more than $2 begin with a
preamble that discloses all charges
associated with the call and
informs callers that they have an
opportunity to hang up before
theyare charged.
Communications,Inc. v. FCC,48 Congress amended § 223 of the Communications Act in 1989 to restrict the use of
900 number dial-a-porn services.4 9 The
law prohibits all obscene telephone
messages. However, due to the First
Amendment's protection of free speech,
the law prohibits indecent telephone
messages only when they are made
50
available to minors.
The industry began to expand beyond dial-a-porn services as new legitimate uses combined with new
interactive technology. Consumer complaints also increased, however, as deceptive telemarketing schemes began
to appear. Between January 1988 and
December 1990, the FCC received approximately 1,900 complaints about
900 numbers. In fact, in November
1990 alone, 15 percent of the complaints received by the FCC concerned
900 numbers.5 In March 1991, the
FCC took the next step in 900 number
regulation by proposing new rules that
would further limit abuses in this growing industry. Those rules, finalized in
November 199 1,' and corresponding
constitutional considerations are addressed below.
Until recently, it was not clear who
had primary responsibility for controlling the 900 number industry. As a
result, many fraudulent scams were
slipping through numerous regulatory
cracks. The multiple sources of responsibility for the 900 number industry and the increase in consumer complaints prompted the FCC to propose
its rules. 3 The rules require that all
900 number messages that charge more
than $2 begin with a preamble that
discloses all charges associated with the

call and informs callers that they have
an opportunity to hang up before they
are charged. The preamble must also
describe the service the caller will receive in exchange for the charge, and it
must disclose the name of the information provider. Further, preambles to
calls directed at children must include
a statement that they should hang up
unless they have obtained parental permission to make the call.- The rules
also require local carriers to offer free
blocking to subscribers. Blocking services prohibit 900 calls from being
made from the blocked telephone number. 55 Further, carriers must provide
identification of 900 service providers
to consumers upon request, 56and common carriers cannot disconnect a
subscriber's basic telephone service if
the subscriber refuses to pay a 900
57
service charge.
D. BalancingFirstAmendment
Protectionof 900 Number
Messages with Consumers' Right
to Be Free From Deception and
Falsehoods
To succeed, the FCC's 900 number
regulations must withstand constitutional challenges under the First Amendment, which protects speech from restrictive governmental regulation. This
protection is not absolute though, and
commercial speech in particular receives less First Amendment protec58
tion than other forms of speech.
1. The Court's Treatment of
Commercial Speech
In 1973, the United States Supreme
Court broadly defined commercial
speech as speech "which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction."' 59 In subsequent commercial
speech cases, the Court tried to clarify
this ambiguous definition. For instance, in CentralHudson Gas & Electric v. PublicService Commission,6 the
Court defined commercial speech as
speech relating "solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience." 61 Although the Court has not
adopted a single, specific definition, it
73
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always has stressed that the distinction
between commercial speech and other
types of speech is a matter of common
62
sense.
The language the Court has used to
distinguish commercial speech may not
be as useful as the speech labeled as
such. For example, the possibility of
economic benefit from or commercial
motivation for certain speech does not
alone make it commercial speech. As
the Court explained in Virginia State

I

The Court defined commercial
speech as speech relating "solely
to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience."

Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens ConsumerCouncil,63 speech does
not become commercial speech merely
because money was paid to project it,
because it was presented in a form sold
for profit, or because it included solicitations to purchase goods or donate
money. For example, books, religious
literature, and paid public service announcements are not considered commercial speech.6' Also, some types of
speech containing both commercial and
noncommercial elements, such as charitable solicitations, are afforded full
First Amendment protection. 6
Initially, commercial speech was
found to have no First Amendment
protection. 66 However, the Court extended limited protection to this type of
speech in VirginiaState BoardofPharmacy in 1976.67 The Court recognized
the importance of the "free flow of
commercial information" and the need
for consumers to have access to this
information to make intelligent and
informed purchasing decisions. 6 The
Court acknowledged that commercial
speech could be regulated to some extent, however, because it was distinct
from other types of speech and thus
commanded a lesser degree of constitutional protection. 9
The Court reasoned that commer74

cial speech could withstand some degree of regulation because it had two
unique characteristics: it was more
durable than other forms of speech, and
it was easier to verify.70 Commercial
speech is deemed more durable because
it is indispensable for profit-seeking
businesses and thus less likely to be
chilled by regulation. Commercial
speech is also more easily verifiable
because the advertiser is presumed to
know best about the product or service
being advertised."
After the Supreme Court established
the less protected status of commercial
speech in VirginiaState BoardofPharmacy, it developed a four-part test for
permissible restraints on commercial
speech in CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission ofNew York.72 First, to receive any
First Amendment protection, the speech
must not be misleading or must not
pertain to unlawful activity. Second,
the government must have a substantial
interest promoted by the restriction.
Third, the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest. Finally, the restraint must not be more
extensive than necessary to advance
73
that interest.
The elements of the CentralHudson
test have been applied since 1980 to
examine governmental restrictions on
commercial speech. However, the last
part of the test was broadened in 1989. 74
In the years immediately following
Central Hudson, many commercial
speech cases interpreted this element to
be a least-restrictive means test, requiring regulations to employ the least
restrictive means possible to promote
the government's interest.75 In Board
of Trustees of State University v. Fox,
the Supreme Court held that commercial speech regulations need not meet a
76
stringent least-restrictive means test.
Instead, the Court supported a more
flexible standard: commercial speech
regulations must use "means narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired objective." Only a reasonable fit is necessary
between the government's interest and
the means employed to promote that

interest.77 Thus, the decision broadened the scope of permissible government restrictions on commercial speech.
2. Balancing the Government's
Interest in Protecting
Consumers from Deception
Regulation of 900 number services
must balance the free speech interests
of marketers and willing recipients with
the government's interest in protecting
consumers from deception. The right
at issue in these cases is the right to be
The Court recognized the
importance of the "free flow of
commercial information" and the
need for consumers to have
access to this information to make
intelligent and informed
purchasing decisions.
free from deception. There is "no
obstacle to a State's dealing effectively
with [deceptive or misleading speech].
The First Amendment ... does not pro-

hibit the State from insuring [sic] that
the stream of commercial information
flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.""8 In
fact, the first part of the CentralHudson
test is that the commercial speech not
be misleading or untruthful. The issue
then focuses on the government's burden in justifying a restriction. To
advance governmental interest in protecting consumers from deception, the
government must show that the targeted speech is "inherently likely to
deceive" or show that "a particular
form or method of advertising has in
fact been deceptive."79' In Zaudererv.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the
Court concluded that the possibility of
deception in that case was self-evident,
but suggested that if it had not been, the
government would have had to survey
the public to determine whether the
advertisement was likely to deceive
consumers. 0 Scholars have argued
that, according to the Zauderer opinion, it cannot be assumed that false and
deceptive commercial speech receives
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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no First Amendment protection. 8
However, in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., the Court held that the FTC, as the
primary federal regulator of deceptive
advertising, may depend on its own
expertise in judging an advertisement's
potential to deceive without consumer
surveys or other evidence of actual
deception. 2 Thus, actual consumer
deception need not occur; the government must show only that the advertisement is likely to deceive consum83
ers.
If the speech is not inherently likely
to deceive, restrictions on it must directly advance a government interest. 8
The specific level of government interest necessary to justify the restriction
of non-deceptive commercial speech
depends upon the nature of the regulation. Content-neutral regulations are
permissible when they advance a significant government interest." Such
regulations are enforced without reference to the speech's content.86 For
example, the Supreme Court has approved content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions on religious solicitations because such restrictions apply
to all solicitations, not only religious
ones. Further, those restrictions promote the government's significant interest in safeguarding the peace and
order of the community. 87 Contentneutral restrictions also have included
prohibiting sound-trucks 8 or solicitations after certain hours.89
On the other hand, content-based
regulations are enforceable only if they
further a compelling government interest. 9° Such regulations are based
completely on the speech's content. 9'
For example, the Court has approved
the content-based prohibition of obscene 900 number messages because,
although the restriction did not apply
uniformly to all messages, the government had a compelling interest in shielding children from obscene materials.'
The extent of First Amendment protection of 900 number speech against
regulation depends on the nature of
both the message sent and the state
interest involved. A strong argument
Volume 5 Number 3/Spring 1993
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representatives have argued that
the preamble requirement
unnecessarily interferes with the
900 services' ability to make
900 number industry
profits.

can be made that television or print
advertisements urging consumers to
call a 900 number do "no more than
propose a commercial transaction."' 93
One case that addressed this issue is
New Kids on the Block v. News America
Publishing.' Although the case involved a trademark infringement and
misappropriation claim, the court discussed whether the First Amendment
protected a 900 number message used
by a magazine to poll readers on their
favorite member of the rock group,
New Kids on the Block. Because the
900 number was used to survey readers
and because the survey results were to
be published in a future issue of the
magazine, the court held that the speech
was constitutionally protected
newsgathering for public dissemination and not less-protected commercial
speech. 95 The district court cited Pittsburgh PressCo. v. PittsburghCommission on Human Relations and Virginia
State BoardofPharmacyto support the
proposition that the magazine's profit
motive alone did not transform its 900
number message into commercial
speech. 96
In dicta, the court also questioned
whether a 900 number service could be
considered a separate commercial enterprise, distinct from the publication
enterprise using it. It dismissed this
question without answering it; the court
speculated, however, that if the 900
number had not been related to a future
magazine article or had continued after
the survey results had been published,
it would have been considered com-

I

If the speech is not inherently
likely to deceive, restrictions on it
must directly advance a
government interest.

mercial speech rather than fully constitutionally protected newsgathering.97
Thus, if a 900 number is used to poll
television viewers or for some other
newsgathering purpose, the message
may be noncommercial speech despite
the profit motive of the service provider. Nonetheless, this is an uncommon type of 900 number. Most 900
services involve only commercial
speech. 98 Whether the 900 message
tries to sell a product or exists as a
product itself, it does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction" (either buying the product or calling the
service again). 99
Those 900 number messages concerning lawful activities should be considered commercial speech; therefore,
they should receive limited First
Amendment protection under the Central Hudson analysis.'
In addition,
under the Fox rationale, government
regulation of these communications will
be permitted only if the means of regulation is narrowly tailored to directly
advance a government interest. 0' Because the new FCC rules relate to the
manner, and not the content, of 900
number advertising and operation, they
are content-neutral regulations requiring only a significant, rather than compelling, government interest. Here, the
government interest in preventing consumer deception and fraud is significant. '0
3. Too Much Regulation?
However, some have argued that the
regulations are more extensive than
necessary. In particular, 900 number
industry representatives have argued
that the preamble requirement unnecessarily interferes with the 900 services' ability to make profits. The
Information Industry Association, a
trade group of 900 service providers,
particularly objected to the FCC's required preamble, arguing that it would
add to the cost of 900 calls and would
discourage repeat calls because customers would tire of hearing the same
message. 103 Another industry trade
group, the National Association for
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Information Services, worried that the
preamble would act as a "kill message,"
meaning it would encourage consumers to hang up rather than simply allowing them that opportunity.°'4 The FCC's
final regulations tried to accommodate
these industry concerns by providing a
mechanism for repeat callers to bypass
the preamble and by omitting the strong
"kill" instruction except for calls from
children under age eighteen. These
required messages tell callers to hang
up unless they have parental consent. 105
Objections also have been raised
about disclosures required in advertisements for 900 numbers. In a different context, the Supreme Court has
approved requiring disclosures or disclaimers as an acceptable means of
regulating commercial speech."° Disclosure requirements are less intrusive
and concern different interests than do
compulsions to speak that "prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein."' 1 7 For
that reason, disclosure or disclaimer
requirements are more likely to pass
constitutional muster. "Because the
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified
principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides, . . . [an advertiser's] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in [its] advertising is minimal."' 8
Disclosure requirements also infringe
much less on an advertiser's interests
than complete prohibitions of speech.
However, "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements"
might violate the First Amendment by
"chilling protected commercial speech."
Disclosure requirements, like other
regulations, must be "reasonably related" to the state's interest." 9
Whether a preamble requirement
impermissively restricts free speech
depends on how the message must be
worded. A required preamble explaining that the caller may hang up without
being charged should not be regarded
76

as intrusive. However, 900 number
providers argue that if the preamble
were required to sound more like an
urgent warning, it could encourage
callers to hang up, effectively restricting the dissemination of legitimate 900
number messages and unnecessarily
adding to the costs of providing the
service.
The required preamble for messages
targeted to children easily passes constitutional muster. Regulations pro-

The required preamble for
messages targeted to children
easilypasses constitutional
muster.
tecting minors always have been more
acceptable than other regulations because of the compelling government
interest in the "well-being of its chil0
In addition, because children
dren." 11
usually have less sophisticated understandings of telephone operations and
the charging system, they are more
vulnerable to deception. Children's
advocates have argued that "because a
child can not make a considered buying
judgment, and because he is at an enormously unequal bargaining position in
the face of sophisticated modem advertising, drawing a child into a decision"
to call a 900 number "is inviting an
unconscionable contract.""'
The 900 services targeted at children have included a 900 number to
call Santa Claus at Christmastime; a
charge-per-minute number advertised
by Arnold Schwarzeneger that urged
children to call and play the "Total
Recall Challenge" game, where callers
scored more points the longer they
stayed on the phone; and a commercial
that urged children too young to dial a
telephone to hold the receiver up to the
television, where an automatic dialing
tone was transmitted that dialed the 900
number." 2 Action for Children's Television has said that such advertisements
are "'especially' unfair and deceptive
since children can 'purchase' the ser-

vice.., and do not necessarily have to
'persuade an adult' to buy the adver' 13
tised product."
The other FCC provisions do not
affect speech, although the requirement that telephone companies offer
900 number blocking to subscribers
may be unnecessarily restrictive. The
new FCC regulations require local carriers to offer interstate 900 number
blocking where it is technologically
feasible." 4 Carriers must offer the
blocking feature free of charge to residential subscribers once, and then local
carriers may charge a "reasonable" fee
for changes in service. The carriers
also may charge commercial customers
for the blocking. However, to block
undesirable 900 number services, customers also must block their access to
all 900 services. Thus, some consumers
face the problem of wanting to use
some 900 services, such as polling or
customer service lines, while they are
unwilling to use, or allow their
children's access to, other services,
such as party talk lines or legal "sex"
lines. In analogous situations, the Supreme Court has suggested that individual blocking of speech is an acceptable way to balance the rights of the
speaker, the willing recipients, and the
unwilling recipients without unconstitutionally restricting the speech. For
example, some state regulations forbid
door-to-door solicitation of people who
have indicated that they do not want to
be disturbed." 5
The 900 number industry has opposed the FCC rules, arguing that selfregulatory measures would be more
effective. One group has proposed
voluntary guidelines requiring disclosure of charges and mandating special
disclosures for calls aimed at children.
In addition, the group's guidelines
would prohibit false or misleading advertising, obscene messages, and messages promoting illegal activities or
violence." 6 Another group proposed
more extensive standards, including
consideration of consumers' right to
privacy and development of standards
for contests, fund-raising, and adverLoyola Consumer Law Reporter
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tising aimed at children." 7 The right of
privacy is not as important in 900
number cases as in other unsolicited
telemarketing cases because the caller
initiates the 900 number transaction.
The right to privacy issue concerns the
fact that data extracted from 900 number callers can be used indiscriminately
by businesses and is discussed infra in
part II of this article."" Nonetheless,
the effectiveness of self-regulation is
questionable because it would not be
mandatory.
4. Long-Distance Carrier
Regulation
Many long-distance carriers already
have guidelines similar to the FCC
rules. AT&T caps charges for 900
numbers targeted to children at $4 and
requires a preamble for messages to
children and messages costing more
than $5 per minute or a total of $10;
MCI has similar requirements." 9 Despite these guidelines, massive consumer complaints have arisen, causing
the National Association of Attorneys
General to question the effectiveness of
the guidelines. 20
1
The problem with carrier-imposed
restrictions is that common carriers are
obligated to provide tariffed services in
a nondiscriminatory manner. Upon
allowing the regional BOCs to begin
transmitting information services,
Judge Greene amended the original
AT&T breakup decree to extend these
anti-discrimination requirements to the
transmission of information services,
including 900 services.' 2' The antidiscrimination provisions were intended
to prevent the BOCs from favoring
either their own services, a particular
long-distance carrier's services, or a
particular information provider's services to the economic disadvantage of
all others.'22 This does not mean,
however, that carriers cannot distinguish information providers on the basis
of "reasonable business classifications." 23 For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a local telephone company's
policy of refusing service to information providers that created sexually
Volume 5 Number 3/Spring 1993

explicit messages. The court reasoned
that the company had not singled out a
particular 900 number service. Instead, it had decided to exclude all adult
entertainment services. Thus, the carrier was permitted to make business
judgments about which messages it
would transmit. 24
Common carriers may also regulate
information providers by refusing to
sell billing and collection services to
information providers creating unde-

I

Localand long-distance carriers
not only must be concerned about
consumer complaints, but they
also must worry about being held
liable to consumers defrauded by
900 numberschemes.

sirable messages. In billing discrimination cases, courts have upheld carriers' refusals to provide billing to certain information providers based on
"reasonable business classifications.' ' 2
Of course, the carriers are prohibited
from using billing methods unfairly
favoring a particular company to the
26
detriment of others.
For example, in response to consumer complaints, Bell Atlantic implemented a policy of refusing billing and
collection services to the 900 numbers
of the long-distance carriers unless they:
(1) limited access to party talk lines and
adult numbers to customers who specifically requested them, and (2) agreed
to pay charges for calls made to such
900 numbers through their long-distance service. 27 In a motion for declaratory judgment, both information
providers and long-distance carriers
argued that Bell Atlantic was discriminating against them. The court rejected
these arguments, however, ruling that
the Bell Atlantic policy applied equally
to all and that the policy was intended
to solve a significant consumer problem, not to create an economic advantage for Bell Atlantic. The court recognized that regional companies' billing
services may be less expensive than

those provided by the long-distance
carriers or the information providers;
nonetheless, this fact did not constitute
discrimination
in violation of the anti12
trust decree.
Likewise, a federal district court in
Nebraska upheld a telephone company's
decision to refuse to sell billing services to all 900 providers who used
autodialers stating that the policy was
non-discriminatory.'29 The telephone
company devised its policy after it
received numerous consumer complaints. Consumers disliked autodialers
and assumed the telephone company
was partially responsible for their use
because the associated 900 charges appeared on the telephone company's
130
bill.
Local and long-distance carriers not
only must be concerned about consumer complaints, but they also must
worry about being held liable to consumers defrauded by 900 number
schemes. Thus far, no carrier has been
held responsible for a fraudulent 900
service it transmits just as, in general,
publishers of advertisements are not
held responsible for the content of
those advertisements.'' Although common carriers are not exactly "publishers" of 900 number messages, they are
in an analogous position to other media
that publish advertisements. In negligence actions against media for publishing deceptive or false advertisements, courts have held that a publisher
has "no duty, whether by way of tort or
contract, to investigate the accuracy of
advertisements... directed to the general public, unless the [publisher] undertakes to guarantee the soundness of
the products advertised."' 3 2 Therefore,
publishers, and by analogy, common
carriers have no liability for misrepresentations in advertisements unless they
publish the information "maliciously,
or with intent to harm another, or with
reckless disregard of the consequences,"
or when the publisher specifically undertakes to endorse the advertised product or service.'33
Recently, when a court ordered the
interstate carrier MCI to turn over
77
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$450,000 from a fraudulent sweepstakes scheme, the carrier first deducted
$165,000 for its own costs, arguing
that it was not liable for the fraudulent
conduct of the service.1' 3 However,
one court suggested that a telephone

are not watching.' 0 As a result, party
lines and other talk lines are losing
business. An owner of such an adult
service stated that "[m]any more companies [are] losing money than making
it," and the talk line business is thus
"seriously over."''

Many television stations also place
restrictions on 900 number

III. CONCLUSION
Business and high technology have
combined to create a multi-billion dollar telemarketing industry. Advances
in telephone and information technology in conjunction with the deregulation of many American telephone companies have helped the 900 number
industry. What was once merely a
medium for pornographic and adult
messages has become a tool for business, interactive multimedia marketing, and even political campaigns.
However, it also has become another method to defraud consumers.
While the FTC traditionally has fought
the battle against fraud and deception,
the FCC recently has joined the effort
in its role as the primary regulator of
interstate telephone transmissions. The
new FCC regulations will prevent some
of the more flagrant abuses in the 900
number market concerning charges and
content. Because 900 number messages are commercial speech and receive First Amendment protection, the
FCC regulations were narrowly tailored to protect consumers from fraud
and deception without restricting speech
beyond constitutional limitations.
The new telephone technology creates many opportunities to send, receive, and collect information. But
with the new opportunities come inherent conflicts that must be resolved carefully. The challenge remains to balance the legitimate business opportunities involved in the use of information
and the rights of citizens to receive such
information, with legitimate concerns
about privacy and freedom from deception. These concerns will also be
addressed at length in Part II of this
article, which will appear in Volume

advertisements, particularly those
for dating services and other adult
lines, as well as those directed at
children.
company, as a publisher of yellow page
advertisements, could be potentially
responsible for misleading advertisements and thus could implement policies to avoid publishing such advertisements.' 35 Meanwhile Telesphere and
Sprint Telemedia, two large interstate
carriers, recently stopped servicing most
900 number providers, citing the difficulty of collecting payments. 3 6 Interestingly, Sprint made the decision after
it became the target of a grand jury
probe.' 37 Likewise, a local phone company, US West Communications, decided to eliminate local 976 number
13 8
services.
Many television stations also place
restrictions on 900 number advertisements, particularly those for dating
services and other adult lines, as well as
those directed at children. For example, a Philadelphia television station
refused to broadcast an advertisement
for a "Dial Santa" 976 number. The
advertisement was to be aired between
Saturday morning cartoons during the
Christmas season and it encouraged
children to call the number to talk to
Santa Claus. The station relied on a
contract clause allowing it a broad right
to refuse broadcasting and a network
policy to avoid advertisements aimed
at children. 3 9 Although most stations
do not have official policies concerning 900 number advertisements, they
will restrict their broadcast to early
morning hours when children probably
78
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A More Convenient But More Expensive Way to Buy Movie
Tickets
Moviegoers living in major American cities will soon be able to avoid long lines
to see popular movies by buying their tickets in advance by phone. But the new
service will tack on an extra couple of dollars to the price of a movie ticket.
Ticketmaster, the nation's largest ticket service, and Movie Fone, a movie
information and ticketing service, have begun operating computer-assisted ticketing
machines in Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and other major metropolitan areas.
The service is popular on weekends when movies are likely to sell out, when new
films are released, and when the weather is cold. Most theater companies add a $1
service charge. Ticketmaster adds a $2 charge for operator-assisted calls and another
$1 for seating in a section set aside for advance ticket buyers. Patrons either pick
up their tickets at the theater or at an automated ticket machine, similar to a bank
teller machine.
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